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Abstract
Deep neural networks have been widely adopted in re-
cent years, exhibiting impressive performances in several
application domains. It has however been shown that they
can be fooled by adversarial examples, i.e., images altered
by a barely-perceivable adversarial noise, carefully crafted
to mislead classification. In this work, we aim to evaluate
the extent to which robot-vision systems embodying deep-
learning algorithms are vulnerable to adversarial exam-
ples, and propose a computationally efficient countermea-
sure to mitigate this threat, based on rejecting classifica-
tion of anomalous inputs. We then provide a clearer under-
standing of the safety properties of deep networks through
an intuitive empirical analysis, showing that the mapping
learned by such networks essentially violates the smooth-
ness assumption of learning algorithms. We finally discuss
the main limitations of this work, including the creation of
real-world adversarial examples, and sketch promising re-
search directions.1
1. Introduction
After decades of research spent in exploring different
approaches, ranging from search algorithms, expert and
rule-based systems to more modern machine-learning algo-
rithms, several problems involving the use of an artificial
intelligence have been finally tackled through the introduc-
tion of a novel paradigm shift based on data-driven artificial
intelligence technologies. In fact, due to the increasing pop-
ularity and use of the modern Internet, along with the pow-
1Accepted for publication at the ICCV 2017 Workshop on Vision in
Practice on Autonomous Robots (ViPAR).
erful computing resources available nowadays, it has been
possible to extract meaningful knowledge from the huge
amount of data collected online, from images to videos, text
and speech data [7]. Deep learning algorithms have pro-
vided an important resource in this respect. Their flexibility
to deal with different kinds of input data, along with their
learning capacity, have made them a powerful instrument to
successfully tackle challenging applications, reporting im-
pressive performance on several tasks in computer vision,
speech recognition and human-robot interactions [11, 21].
Despite their undiscussed success in several real-world
applications, several open problems remain to be addressed.
Research work has been investigating how to interpret de-
cisions taken by deep learning algorithms, unveiling the
patterns learned by deep networks at each layer [30, 17].
Although a significant progress have been made in this di-
rection, and it is now clear that such networks gradually
learn more abstract concepts (e.g., from detecting elemen-
tary shapes in images to more abstract notions of objects or
animals), a relevant effort is still required to gain deeper in-
sights. This is also important to understand why such algo-
rithms may be vulnerable to the presence of adversarial ex-
amples, i.e., input data that are slightly modified to mislead
classification by the addition of an almost-imperceptible ad-
versarial noise [16, 19]. The presence of adversarial exam-
ples have been shown on a variety of tasks, including object
recognition in images, handwritten digit recognition, and
face recognition [24, 25, 10, 19, 20].
In this work, we are the first to show that robot-vision
systems based on deep learning algorithms are also vulner-
able to this potential threat. This is a crucial problem, as
embodied agents have a more direct, physical interaction
with humans than virtual agents, and the damage caused
by adversarial examples in this context can thus be much
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Figure 1: Architecture of the iCub robot-vision system [21]. After image acquisition, a region of interest containing the object
is cropped and processed by the ImageNet deep network [13]. The deep features extracted from the penultimate layer of such
network (fc7) are then used as input to the classification algorithm to perform the recognition task, in which the probabilities
that the object belongs to each (known) class are reported. A human annotator can then validate or correct decisions, and the
classification algorithm can be updated accordingly; for instance, to learn that an object belongs to a never-before-seen class.
more concerning. To demonstrate this vulnerability, we
focus on a case study involving the iCub humanoid robot
(Sect. 2) [18, 21]. A peculiarity of humanoid robots is that
they have to be able to learn in an online fashion, from the
stimuli received during their exploration of the surround-
ing environment. For this reason, a crucial requirement for
them is to embody completely the acquired knowledge, and
a reliable and efficient learning paradigm. As discussed in
previous work [21], this is a conflicting goal with the cur-
rent state of deep learning algorithms, which are too com-
putationally and power demanding to be fully embodied by
a humanoid robot. For this reason, the authors in [21] have
proposed to use a pre-trained deep network for object recog-
nition to perform feature extraction (essentially considering
as the feature vector for the detected object one of the last
convolutional layers in the deep network), and then train a
multiclass classifier on such feature representation.
The first contribution of this work is to show the vul-
nerability of these kinds of robot-vision system to adversar-
ial examples. To this end, we propose an alternative algo-
rithm for the generation of adversarial examples (Sect. 3),
which extends previous work on the evasion of binary to
multiclass classifiers [4]. Conversely to previous work deal-
ing with the generation of adversarial examples based on
minimum-distance perturbations [25, 10, 19, 20], our al-
gorithm enables creating adversarial examples misclassi-
fied with higher confidence, under a maximum input pertur-
bation, for which devising proper countermeasures is also
more difficult. This allows one to assess classifier security
more thoroughly, by evaluating the probability of evading
detection as a function of the maximum input perturbation.
Notably, it also allows manipulating only a region of interest
in the input image, such that creating real-world adversarial
examples becomes easier; e.g., one may only modify some
image pixels corresponding to a sticker that can be subse-
quently applied to the object of interest.
The second contribution of this work is the proposal of
a computationally-efficient countermeasure, inspired from
work on classification with the reject option and open-set
recognition, to mitigate the threat posed by adversarial ex-
amples. Its underlying idea is to detect and reject the so-
called blind-spot evasion points, i.e., samples which are suf-
ficiently far from known training data. This countermeasure
is particularly suited to our case study, as it requires modi-
fying only the learning algorithm applied on top of the deep
feature representation, i.e., only the output layer (Sect. 4).
We then report an empirical evaluation (Sect. 5) showing
that the iCub humanoid is vulnerable to adversarial exam-
ples and to which extent our proposed countermeasure can
improve its security. In particular, although it does not com-
pletely address the vulnerability of such system to adver-
sarial examples, it requires one to significantly increase the
amount of perturbation on the input images to reach a com-
parable probability of misleading a correct object recog-
nition. To better understand the reason behind this phe-
nomenon, we provide a further, simple and intuitive empir-
ical analysis, showing that the mapping learned by the deep
network used for deep feature extraction essentially violates
the smoothness assumption of learning techniques in the in-
put space. This means that, in practice, for a sufficiently
high amount of perturbation, the proposed algorithm creates
adversarial examples that are mapped onto a region of the
deep feature space which is densely populated by training
examples of a different class. Accordingly, only modifying
the classification algorithm on top of the pre-trained deep
features (without re-training the underlying deep network)
may not be sufficient in this case.
We conclude this paper discussing related work (Sect. 6),
and relevant future research directions (Sect. 7).
2. The iCub Humanoid
Our case study focuses on the iCub humanoid, as it pro-
vides a cognitive humanoid robotic platform well suited to
our task [18, 21]. In particular, the visual recognition sys-
tem of this humanoid relies on deep learning technologies
to interact with the surrounding environment, enabling it
to detect and to recognize known objects, i.e., objects that
have been verbally annotated in a previous session by a hu-
man teacher. Furthermore, iCub is capable of performing
online learning, i.e., after classification, it asks to the hu-
man teacher whether the corresponding decision is correct.
If the decision is wrong (e.g., in the case of an object be-
longing to a never-before-seen class), the human teacher
can provide feedback to the robot, which in turn updates
its classification model through online or incremental learn-
ing techniques (e.g., by expanding the set of known object
classes). This a clear example of how a robot can learn from
experience to improve its capabilities, i.e., a key aspect of
why embodying knowledge within robots is of crucial rele-
vance for these tasks [21]. However, given the limited hard-
ware and power resources of the humanoid, it is clear that
retraining the whole deep learning infrastructure becomes
too computationally demanding. For this reason, the visual
system of iCub exploits the pre-trained ImageNet deep net-
work [13] only for extracting a set of deep features (from
one of the highest convolutional layers) and uses this fea-
ture vector to represent the object detected by iCub in the
input image. As described in Fig. 1, this deep feature vec-
tor is then classified using a separate classifier, which can
be retrained online in an efficient manner when feedback
from the human annotator is received. In particular, in [21]
this classifier is implemented using a one-versus-all scheme
to combine a set of c linear classifiers, being c the num-
ber of known classes. Let us denote the pixel values of
the input image (in raster-scan order) with x ∈ X ⊆ Rd
(where d = 128 × 128 × 3), and the discriminant func-
tions of the aforementioned one-versus-all linear classifiers
as f1(x), . . . , fc(x). Accordingly, the predicted class c? is
determined as the class whose discriminant function for that
sample is maximum:
c? = arg max
k=1,...,c
fk(x) . (1)
The linear classifiers used for this purpose include Sup-
port Vector Machines (SVMs) and Recursive Least Square
(RLS) classifiers, as both can be efficiently updated on-
line [21]. Notably, previous work has shown that replacing
the softmax layer in deep networks with a multiclass SVM
can be effective also in different applications [27].
3. Adversarial Security Evaluation
We discuss here our proposal to assess the security of
robot-vision systems to adversarial examples. As in pre-
vious work addressing the issue of evaluating security of
machine-learning algorithms [1, 12, 5, 4, 28], our under-
lying idea is to evaluate the maximum recognition accu-
racy degradation against an increasing maximum admissi-
ble level of perturbation of the input images. This is rather
different than previous work in which adversarial exam-
ples correspond to minimally-perturbed samples that are
wrongly classified [25, 10, 19, 20]. As we will see in our
experiments, besides providing a more complete evaluation
of system security against adversarial examples, our attack
strategy also highlights additional interesting insights on
system security, including the identification of vulnerabil-
ities in the feature representation (rather than in the classi-
fication algorithm itself) through the creation of adversarial
examples that are indistinguishable from training samples
of a different class.
Our approach is based on extending the work in [4] for
evasion of binary classifiers to the multiclass case. To this
end, we define two possible evasion settings, i.e., ways
of creating adversarial examples, which further differenti-
ate our technique from previous work on the creation of
minimally-perturbed adversarial examples [25, 10, 19, 20].
In particular, we consider an error-generic and an error-
specific evasion setting. In the error-generic scenario, the
attacker is interested in misleading classification, regardless
of the output class predicted by the classifier for the adver-
sarial examples; e.g., for a known terrorist the goal may be
to evade detection by a video surveillance system, regard-
less of the identity that may be erroneously associated to
his/her face. Conversely, in the error-specific setting, the at-
tacker still aims to mislead classification, but requiring the
adversarial examples to be misclassified as a specific, tar-
get class; e.g., imagine an attacker aiming to impersonate a
specific user.2
The two settings can be formalized in terms of two dis-
tinct optimization problems, though using the same formu-
lation for the objective function Ω(x):
Ω(x) = fk(x)−max
l 6=k
fl(x) . (2)
This function essentially represents a difference between a
preselected discriminant function (associated to class k) and
the competing one, i.e., the one exhibiting the highest value
at x among the remaining c − 1 classes (i.e., all classes
{1, . . . , c} except k). We discuss below how class k is cho-
sen in the two considered settings.
Error-generic Evasion. In this case, the optimization prob-
2In [20], the authors defined targeted and indiscriminate attacks de-
pending on whether the attacker aims to cause specific or generic errors,
similarly to our settings. Here we do not follow their naming convention,
as it causes confusion with the interpretation of targeted and indiscriminate
attacks introduced in previous work [1, 12, 5].
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Figure 2: Error-specific (left) and error-generic (right) eva-
sion of a multiclass SVM with the Radial Basis Function
(RBF) kernel. Decision boundaries among the three classes
(blue, red and green points) are shown as black solid lines.
In the error-specific case, the initial (blue) sample is shifted
towards the green class (selected as the target one). In
the error-generic case, instead, it is shifted towards the red
class, as it is the closest class to the initial sample. The `2
distance constraint is also shown as a gray circle.
lem can be formulated as:
min
x′
Ω(x′) , (3)
s.t. d(x,x′) ≤ dmax , (4)
xlb  x′  xub , (5)
where fk(x) in the objective function Ω(x) (Eq. 2) denotes
the discriminant function associated to the true class of the
source sample x, and d(x,x′) ≤ dmax represents a con-
straint on the maximum input perturbation dmax between x
(i.e., the input image) and the corresponding modified ad-
versarial example x′, given in terms of a distance in the
input space. Normally, the `2 distance between pixel values
is used as the function d(·, ·), but other metrics can be also
adopted (e.g., one may use an `1-based constraint to inject a
sparse adversarial noise rather than a slight image blurring
as that caused by the `2-based constraint) [8, 22]. The box
constraint xlb  x′  xub (where u  v means that each
element ofu has to be not greater than the corresponding el-
ement in v) is optional, and can be used to bound the input
values x of the adversarial examples; e.g., each pixel value
in images is bounded between 0 and 255. Nevertheless, the
box constraint can be also used to manipulate only some
pixels in the image. For example, if some pixels should not
be manipulated, one can set the corresponding values of xlb
and xub equal to those of x. This is of crucial importance
for creating real-world adversarial examples, as it allows
one to avoid manipulating pixels which do not belong to
the object of interest. For instance, this may enable one to
create an “unusual” sticker to be attached to an adversarial
object, similarly to the idea exploited in [24] for the creation
of wearable objects used to fool face recognition systems.
Error-specific Evasion. The problem of error-specific eva-
sion is formulated as the error-generic evasion problem in
Algorithm 1 Computation of Adversarial Examples
Input: x0: the input image; η: the step size; r ∈
{−1,+1}: variable set to −1 (+1) for error-generic
(error-specific) evasion;  > 0: a small number.
Output: x′: the adversarial example.
1: x′ ← x0
2: repeat
3: x← x′, and x′ ← Π (x+ rη∇Ω(x))
4: until |Ω(x′)− Ω(x)| ≤ 
5: return x′
Eqs. (3)-(5), with the only differences that: (i) the objective
function is maximized; and (ii) fk denotes the discriminant
function associated to the targeted class, i.e., the class which
the adversarial example should be assigned to.
An example of the different behavior exhibited by the
two attacks is given in Fig. 2. Both attacks are constructed
using the simple gradient-based algorithm given as Algo-
rithm 1. The basic idea is to update the adversarial exam-
ple by following the steepest descent (or ascent) direction
(depending on whether we are considering error-generic or
error-specific evasion), and use a projection operator Π to
keep the updated point within the feasible domain (given by
the intersection of the box and the `2 constraint).
Gradient computation. One key issue of the aforemen-
tioned algorithm is the computation of the gradient of Ω(x),
which involve the gradients of the discriminant function
fi(x) for i ∈ 1, . . . , c. It is not difficult to see that this
can be computed using the chain rule to decouple the gradi-
ent of the discriminant function of the classifier trained on
the deep feature space and the gradient of the deep network
used for feature extraction, as ∇fi(x) = ∂fi(z)∂z ∂z∂x , being
z ∈ Rm the set of deep features. In our case study, these
are the m = 4, 096 values extracted from layer fc7 (see
Fig. 1). Notably, the gradient of the deep network ∂z∂x is
readily available through automatic differentiation, as also
highlighted in previous work [25, 10, 19, 20], whereas the
availability of the gradient ∂fi(z)∂z depends on whether the
chosen classifier is differentiable or not. Several of the most
used classifiers are differentiable, including, e.g., SVMs
with differentiable kernels (we refer the reader to [4] for
further details). Nevertheless, if the classifier is not differ-
entiable (e.g., like in the case of decision trees), one may
use a surrogate differentiable classifier to approximate it, as
also suggested in [4, 8, 22].
4. Classifier Security to Adversarial Examples
If the evasion algorithm drives the adversarial examples
deeply into regions populated by known training classes (as
shown in Fig. 2), there is no much one can do to correctly
identify them from the rest of the data by only re-training or
modifying the classifier, i.e., modifying the shape of the de-
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Figure 3: Conceptual representation of our idea behind improving iCub security to adversarial examples, using multiclass
SVMs with RBF kernels (SVM-RBF), without reject option (no defense, left), with reject option (middle), and with modified
thresholds to increase the rejection rate (right). Rejected samples are highlighted with black contours. The adversarial
example (black star) is misclassified as a red sample by SVM-RBF (left plot), while SVM-RBF with reject option correctly
identifies it as an adversarial example (middle plot). Rejection thresholds can be modified to increase classifier security (right
plot), though at the expense of misclassifying more legitimate (i.e., non-manipulated) samples.
cision boundaries in the feature space. We propose to con-
sider this problem as an intrinsic vulnerability of the feature
representation: if the feature vector of an adversarial ex-
ample becomes indistinguishable from those of the training
samples of a different class, it can only be detected by using
a different feature representation (i.e., in the case of iCub,
this would require at least re-training the underlying deep
network responsible for deep feature extraction).3 However,
this is not always the case, especially in high-dimensional
spaces, or if classes are separated with a sufficiently high
margin. In this case, as depicted in Fig. 3, there may be very
large regions of the feature space which are only scarcely
populated by data, although being associated (potentially
also with high confidence) to known classes by the learning
algorithm. Accordingly, adversarial examples may quite
reasonably end up in such regions while also successfully
fooling detection. These samples are often referred to as
blind-spot evasion samples, as they are capable of mislead-
ing classification, but in regions of the space which are far
from the rest of the training data [12, 25]. Conversely to the
case of indistinguishable adversarial examples, blind-spot
adversarial examples can be detected by only modifying
the classifier (i.e., without re-training the underlying deep
network used by iCub). Accordingly, we propose to con-
sider the problem of blind-spot adversarial examples as an
intrinsic vulnerability of the classification algorithm. Dif-
ferent approaches have been proposed based on modifying
the classifier, ranging from 1.5-class classification (based on
the combination of anomaly detectors and two-class classi-
fiers) [3] to open-set recognition techniques [23, 2].
We propose here a more direct approach, based on the
3Here, we only refer to the classifier trained on top of the deep feature
representation as the classification algorithm. This definition excludes the
pre-trained deep network used for feature extraction in iCub, as it is not
re-trained online.
same idea underlying the notion of classification with a re-
ject option, and leveraging some concepts from open-set
recognition. In particular, we consider SVMs with RBF
kernels to implement the multiclass classifier in our case
study, as these SVMs belong to the so-called class of Com-
pact Abating Probability (CAP) models [23] (i.e., classifiers
whose discriminant function decreases while getting farther
from the training data). Then, by applying a simple rejec-
tion mechanism on their discriminant function, we can iden-
tify samples which are far enough from the rest of the train-
ing data, i.e., blind-spot adversarial examples. Our idea is
thus to modify the decision rule in Eq. (1) as:
c? = arg max
k=1,...,c
fk(x) , only if fc?(x) > 0 , (6)
otherwise classify x as an adversarial example (i.e., a novel
class). In practice this means that, if no classifier assigns the
sample to an existing class (i.e., no value of f is positive),
then we simply categorize it as an adversarial example. In
our specific case study, iCub may reject classification and
ask the human annotator to label the example correctly. No-
tably, the threshold of each discriminant function (i.e., the
biases of the one-versus-all SVMs) can be adjusted to tune
the trade-off between the rejection rate of adversarial exam-
ples and the fraction of incorrectly-rejected samples (which
are not adversarially manipulated), as shown in Fig. 3.
5. Experimental Analysis
In this section we report the results of the security eval-
uation performed on the iCub system (see Sect. 2) along
with few adversarial examples to show how the proposed
evasion algorithm can be exploited to create real-world at-
tack samples. We then provide a conceptual representation
and an empirical analysis to explain why neural networks
Cup
Dishwashing
Detergent
Laundry
Detergent Plate Soap Sponge Sprayer
Figure 4: Example images (one per class) from the
iCubWorld28 dataset, and subset of classes used in the
iCubWorld7 dataset (highlighted in red).
are easily fooled and how our defense mechanism can im-
prove their security in this context.
Experimental Setup. Our analysis has been performed us-
ing the iCubWorld28 dataset [21], consisting of 28 different
classes which include 7 different objects (cup, plate, etc.) of
4 different kinds each (e.g., cup1, cup2, etc.), as shown in
Fig. 4. Each object was shown to iCub which automati-
cally detected it and cropped the corresponding object im-
age. Four acquisition sessions were performed in four dif-
ferent days, ending up with approximately 20, 000 images
for training and test sets. As shown in [21], it is very diffi-
cult for iCub to be able to distinguish such slight category
distinctions, like different kinds of cups. For this reason, we
also consider here a reduced dataset, iCubWorld7 , consist-
ing only of 7 different objects, each of a different kind. The
selected objects are highlighted in red in Fig. 4.
We implement the classification algorithm using three
different multiclass SVM versions, all based on a one-
versus-all scheme: a linear SVM (denoted with SVM in
the following); an SVM with the RBF kernel (SVM-RBF);
and an SVM with the RBF kernel implementing our de-
fense mechanism based on rejection of adversarial exam-
ples (SVM-adv, Sect. 4). The regularization parameter
C ∈ {10−3, . . . , 103} and the RBF kernel parameter γ ∈
{10−6, . . . , 10−2} have been set equal for all one-versus-all
SVMs in each multiclass classifier, by maximizing recogni-
tion accuracy through 3-fold cross validation.
Baseline Performance. In Fig. 5 we report a box plot show-
ing the empirical probability distributions of the accuracy
achieved by the SVM classifier on increasingly larger ob-
ject identification tasks, as suggested in [21]. To this end,
we randomly select 300 subsets of increasing size from the
iCubWorld28 dataset (day4 acquisitions), and then train
and test the classifier on each subset. The achieved accu-
racy is considered an observation for estimating the empir-
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Figure 5: Box plots of the recognition accuracies measured
for linear SVM predictors trained on random subsets from
2 to 28 objects (whiskers with maximum 1.5 interquartile
range). Dotted super-imposed curves represent the mini-
mum accuracy guaranteed within a fixed confidence level.
ical distributions. The minimum accuracy value for which
the fraction of observations in the estimated distribution was
higher than a specific confidence threshold is indicated as
a dotted line. Notably the reported performances for the
linear SVM are almost identical to those reported in [21],
where a different algorithm is used. Similar performances
(omitted for brevity) are obtained using SVM-RBF.
Security Evaluation against Adversarial Examples. We
now investigate the security of iCub in the presence of ad-
versarial examples. In this experiment, we consider the
first 100 examples per class for both the iCubWorld28 and
iCubWorld7 datasets, ending up with training and test sets
consisting of 2, 800 and 700 samples, respectively. The
recognition accuracy against an increasing maximum ad-
missible `2 perturbation (i.e., dmax value) is reported in
Fig. 6 for both error-specific (top row plots) and error-
generic (bottom row plots) attack scenarios. For error-
specific evasion, we average our results not only on differ-
ent training-test set splits, but also by considering a differ-
ent target class in each repetition. While SVM and SVM-
RBF show a comparable decrease of accuracy at increas-
ing dmax, SVM-adv is able to strongly improve the security
in most of the cases (as the corresponding curve decreases
more gracefully). Notably, the performance of SVM-adv
even increases for low values of dmax. A plausible reason is
that, even if all testing images are only slightly modified in
input space, they immediately become blind-spot adversar-
ial examples, ending up in a region which is far from the rest
of the data. As the input perturbation increases, such sam-
ples are gradually drifted inside a different class, becoming
indistinguishable from the samples of such class.
To further improve the security of iCub to adversarial
examples, we set the rejection threshold of SVM-adv to a
more conservative value, increasing the false negative rate
for each base classifier of 5% (estimated on a validation set).
This results in a significant security improvement, as shown
in the rightmost plots in Fig. 6. However, as expected, this
comes at the expense of misclassifying more legitimate (i.e.
non-manipulated) samples.
Real-world Adversarial Examples. In Fig. 7 we report
few adversarial examples generated using an error-specific
evasion attack on the iCubWorld28 data. Notably, the ad-
versarial perturbation required to evade the system can be
barely perceived by human eyes. As an important real-
world application of the proposed attack algorithm, in the
bottom right plots of Fig. 7, we report an adversarial exam-
ple generated by manipulating only a subset of the image
pixels, corresponding to the label of the detergent. In this
case, the perturbation becomes easier to spot for a human,
but localizing the noise in a region of interest allows the at-
tacker to construct a practical, real-world adversarial object,
by simply attaching an “adversarial” sticker to the original
object before showing it to the iCub humanoid robot.
Why are Deep Nets Fooled? Our analysis shows that also
the iCub vision system can be fooled by adversarial ex-
amples, even by only adding a slightly-noticeable noise to
the input image. To better understand the root causes of
this phenomenon, we now provide an empirical analysis of
the sensitivity of the feature mapping induced by the Im-
ageNet deep network used by iCub, by comparing the `2
distance corresponding to random and adversarial pertur-
bations in the input space, with the one measured in the
deep feature space. To this end, we randomly perturb each
training image such that the `2 distance between the ini-
tial and the perturbed image in the input space equals 10.
We then measure the `2 distance between the deep feature
vectors corresponding to the same images. For randomly-
perturbed images, the average distance in deep space (along
with its standard deviation) is 0.022 ± 0.002, while for the
adversarially-perturbed images, it is 2.386 ± 0.386. This
means that random perturbations in the input space only
result in a very small shift in the deep space, while even
light alterations of an image along the adversarial direction
cause a large shift in deep space, which in turn highlights a
significant instability of the deep feature space mapping in-
duced by the ImageNet network. In other words, this means
that images in the input space are very close to the de-
cision boundary along the adversarial (gradient) direction,
as conceptually represented in Fig. 8. Note that this is a
general issue for deep networks, not only specific to Ima-
geNet [26, 9, 25, 10, 19, 20].
It should be thus clear that even a well-crafted modifi-
cation of the last layers of the network, as in our proposed
defense mechanism SVM-adv, can only mitigate this vul-
nerability. Indeed, it remains intimately related to the sta-
bility of the deep feature space mapping, which can be only
addressed by imposing specific constraints while training
the deep neural network; e.g., by imposing that small shifts
in the input space correspond to small changes in the deep
space, as recently proposed in [31]. Another possible coun-
termeasure to improve stability of such mapping is to en-
force classification of samples within a minimum margin,
by modifying the neurons’ activation functions and, poten-
tially, considering a different regularizer for the objective
function optimized by the deep network. In this respect, it
would be interesting to investigate more in detail the inti-
mate connections between robustness to adversarial input
noise and regularization, as highlighted in [29, 22].
6. Related Work
Previous work has investigated the problem of adversar-
ial examples in deep networks [25, 10, 19, 20, 26, 9], focus-
ing however on minimally-perturbed adversarial examples,
i.e., examples that simply lie inside the decision region of a
known class, even if they remain far from the corresponding
training examples; on the contrary, our approach is based
on creating maximally-perturbed (indistinguishable) adver-
sarial examples (misclassified with high confidence). Dif-
ferent techniques aimed at improving the security of deep
networks have also been proposed. Some of them attempt
to reduce classifier vulnerability by directly detecting and
rejecting adversarial examples [2, 15]. The technique of [2]
is based on open-set recognition: it rejects samples whose
distance from the centroids of all the classes exceeds a given
threshold. However, it has not been evaluated using adver-
sarial examples carefully generated to evade the classifier.
In [15], adversarial examples are detected using the output
of the first convolutional layers. A different approach has
been proposed in [31]: it aims at improving the stability
of the deep feature space mapping by retraining the net-
work using an objective function that penalizes examples
(images) that are close in input space but lie far in deep fea-
ture space. This approach has however been investigated
only against small image distortions.
7. Conclusions and Future Work
Deep learning has shown groundbreaking performance
in several real-world application domains, encompassing
areas like computer vision, speech recognition and language
processing, among others. Despite its impressive perfor-
mances, recent work has shown how deep neural networks
can be fooled by well-crafted adversarial examples affected
by a barely-perceivable adversarial noise. In this work, we
have developed a novel algorithm for the generation of ad-
versarial examples which enables a more complete evalu-
ation of the security of a learning algorithm, and apply it
to investigate the security of the robot-vision system of the
iCub humanoid. Even if we do not restrict ourselves to the
manipulation of pixels belonging to the object of interest in
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Figure 6: Recognition accuracy of iCub (using the three different classifiers SVM, SVM-RBF, and SVM-adv) against an
increasing maximum admissible `2 input perturbation dmax, for iCubWorld28 (left column) and iCubWorld7 (middle and
right columns), using error-specific (top row), and error-generic (bottom row) adversarial examples. Baseline accuracies (in
the absence of perturbation) are reported at dmax = 0.
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Figure 7: Plots in the top row show an adversarial example from class laundry-detergent3, modified to be misclassified as
cup3, using an error-specific evasion attack, for increasing levels of input perturbation (reported in the title of the plots).
Plots in the bottom row show the minimally-perturbed adversarial example that evades detection (i.e., the sample that evades
detection with minimum dmax), along with the corresponding noise applied to the initial image (amplified to make it clearly
visible), for the case in which all pixels can be manipulated (first and second plot), and for the case in which modifications
are constrained to the label of the detergent (i.e., simulating a sticker that can be applied to the real-world adversarial object).
the image (which could lead one to more easily generate the
corresponding real-world adversarial object, e.g., by mean
of the application of specific stickers to objects), we have
shown how our algorithm enables this additional possibil-
Figure 8: Conceptual representation of the vulnerability of the deep feature space mapping. The left and right plots respec-
tively represent images in input space and the corresponding deep feature vectors. Randomly-perturbed versions of an input
image are shown as gray points, while the adversarially-perturbed image is shown as a red point. Despite these points are at
the same distance from the input image in the input space, the adversarial example is much farther in the deep feature space.
This also means that images are very close to the decision boundary in input space, although in an adversarial direction that
is difficult to guess at random due to the high dimensionality of the input space.
ity. Notably, even if we have not constructed any real-world
adversarial object during our experiments, recent work has
shown that the artifacts introduced by printing images and
re-acquiring them through a camera are irrelevant, and do
not eliminate the problem of the existence of adversarial
examples [14]. Similarly, another work has shown how to
evade face recognition systems based on deep learning by
using adversarial glasses and other accessories [24]. These
recent evidences clearly give a much higher practical rele-
vance to the problem of adversarial examples.
We have demonstrated and quantified the vulnerability
of iCub to the presence of adversarial manipulations of the
input images, and suggested a simple countermeasure to
mitigate the threat posed by such an issue. We have addi-
tionally shown that, while blind-spot adversarial examples
can be detected using our defense mechanism, to further
improve the security of iCub against indistinguishable ad-
versarial examples, re-training the classification algorithm
on top of a pre-trained deep neural network is not suffi-
cient. To this end, different strategies to enforce the deep
network to learn a more stable deep feature representation
(in which small perturbations to the input data correspond
to small perturbations in the deep feature space) should also
be adopted, like the one proposed in [31].
Other interesting research directions for this work in-
clude evaluating security of robot-vision systems against
other threats, including the threat of data poisoning [12,
6, 5], in which a malicious human annotator may provide
few wrong labels to the humanoid to completely mislead
its learning process and enforce it to misclassify as many
objects as possible. In general, a comprehensive, standard-
ized framework for evaluating the security of such systems
while providing also more formal verification procedures
is still lacking, and we believe that this constitutes a fun-
damental requirement for the complete transition of deep-
learning-based systems in safety-critical applications, like
robots performing life-critical tasks and self-driving cars.
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